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Abstract: This paper addresses the dependability 
modelling and evaluation of two safety-related 
applications that are based on communications 
between vehicles and between vehicles and fixed 
infrastructures: automated highway systems and 
virtual black boxes. The main objective is to develop 
model-based evaluation approaches to analyze and 
quantify the dependability of such applications. 
Modelling is based on Stochastic Activity Networks. 
The results show the significant impact of some 
mobility parameters on application availability and 
safety. 
Keywords: Dependability modelling, evaluation, 
communicating vehicles, mobility, ad-hoc networks 
1. Introduction 
Traffic is more and more growing, reducing inevitably 
the safety of vehicles and their occupants. Several 
solutions, based on new mobility and communication 
technologies have been envisaged to increase 
safety, among which Automated Highway Systems 
(AHS) and Virtual Black Boxes (VBB). AHS and 
particularly platooning applications based on 
automatically controlled platoons of coordinated 
vehicles constitute an efficient solution to increase 
highway safety by adding automation to the vehicles 
and to the roadside without building new roads. 
However, automation may induce new safety 
problems (due for example to the loss of 
communications for coordination or to malicious 
threats) that should be taken into account too when 
analyzing system safety. The VBB application is 
inspired from the black box for avionics systems. 
However, instead of a robust and expensive 
hardware black box, the data storage is based on a 
cost effective software solution. The VBB stores 
important historical information on the vehicles that 
can be retrieved and analysed in the event of an 
accident [1]. 
Both AHS and VBB use a combination of ad-hoc and 
infrastructure based communication networks. AHS 
and VBB can be used individually and can be 
combined to increase safety.  
This paper addresses the dependability analysis and 
evaluation of AHS and VBB applications, based in 
particular on Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN [2]). 
This formalism and the associated Möbius tool [3] 
provide compositional operators that are useful to 
master the complexity of the models, both at model 
construction and model processing phase. In 
particular, the system model can be built by the 
composition of atomic models using Join and 
Replicate operators. 
A platoon is a series of coordinated vehicles moving 
in the same direction on a highway [4], controlled by 
the vehicle at the head of the platoon (leader). The 
vehicles are driven by more or less automated 
agents, interacting in a multi-agent environment [5]. 
Switching to manual driving is possible under 
specific circumstances. The application combines 
vehicle data with position and map data. 
Longitudinal control of the vehicle is provided in 
order to maintain the short-range headway following 
within a platoon (similar to adaptive cruise control). 
Lateral control via automated steering provides lane-
keeping and lane-change manoeuvres of platoon 
vehicles in a coordinated manner. In case of a failure 
in one vehicle, a well defined set of manoeuvres are 
used to help the failed vehicle to leave the platoon 
and to preserve the safety of the other vehicles.  
Our work is aimed at quantifying the impact of some 
characteristics of the AHS (e.g., the coordination 
strategy, the failure rates, the platoon length, and the 
trip duration) on the highway safety. 
In the VBB application, periodically, historical data 
items about the vehicle s state (speed and 
movements of the vehicle, actuation of brakes, 
direction indicator, light, and throttle position(s), etc.) 
are recorded. Due to the limited storage facilities 
within the vehicle, and to the fact that in case of an 
accident the data stored on the vehicle can be lost, 
the VBB is resident on the fixed infrastructure. To 
increase the availability of the VBB, the data related 
to the concerned vehicle, referred to as the Vehicle, 
is replicated temporarily on vehicles encountered by 
the Vehicle, referred to as participant vehicles (or 
participants), using data replication strategies.  
Our work is aimed at evaluating the availability of the 
data in the VBB, taking into account possible data 
replication strategies, and various mobility scenarios 
characterized by the rates at which connections 
occur with the fixed infrastructure and between the 
vehicles in the ad-hoc domain. 
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Section 2 of this paper is dedicated to the AHS 
safety while Section 3 is devoted to VBB data 
availability. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Platooning Application 
We consider the architectures developed in the 
context of the PATH project (Partners for Advanced 
Transit and Highways) [6]. These architectures 
implement recovery manoeuvres to ensure the 
platoons safety in the presence of different types of 
failures affecting the vehicles and their environment. 
To this end, they require coordination between the 
vehicles in the platoon (intra-platoon) and with 
neighbouring platoons (inter-platoon). Various 
communication models (centralized and 
decentralized) have been proposed in [7] for the 
inter- and intra-platoon coordination, based on the 
PATH architecture. In our work we have considered 
the four strategies resulting from the combination of 
the above models, given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Coordination strategies considered 
Strategy Inter-platoon model Intra-platoon model 
DD Decentralized Decentralized 
DC Decentralized Centralized 
CD Centralized Decentralized 
CC Centralized Centralized 
Several failure modes, can affect the vehicles 
involved in platoons and their safety [4,13]. In our 
work, we have considered six potential failure modes 
that may affect a single vehicle, presented in Table 
2. This table shows for each failure mode, an 
example of cause, the severity class, and the 
maneuver that ensures the safe continuity of service 
despite the presence of failures.  
Table 2: Failure modes and associated manoeuvres 
Failure 
mode
Example  
of cause 
Severity 
class 
Associated  
Manoeuvre 
FM1 No brakes A Aided Stop (AS) 
FM2 
Inability to detect 
vehicles in adjacent 
lanes 
A Crash Stop (CS) 
FM3 Inter-vehicle com-
munication failure A Gentle Stop (GS) 
FM4 Transmission failure B Take Immediate Exit-Escorted (TIE-E) 
FM5 Reduced steering 
capability B 
Take Immediate Exit 
(TIE) 
FM6 Single failure in a 
redundant sensor set C 
Take Immediate Exit-
Normal (TIE-N) 
The severity classes are ranked by decreasing 
order. Class A is the highest, gathering the most 
critical failures that need to stop the vehicle on the 
highway. Three manoeuvres are defined: Gentle 
Stop (GS, the faulty vehicle uses its brakes smoothly 
to stop), Crash Stop (CS, the faulty vehicle uses 
maximum emergency braking), and Aided Stop (AS, 
the faulty vehicle is stopped by the vehicle 
immediately ahead). Specific control laws are then 
used to ease congestion, divert traffic away from the 
incident, assist emergency vehicles, and get the 
queued vehicles out.  
The B and C severity classes include the failure 
modes that can be recovered by allowing the faulty 
vehicle to get out of the highway without stopping the 
traffic. The corresponding manoeuvres can be 
achieved either without assistance or with the 
cooperation of some adjacent vehicles. Three 
manoeuvres are defined too: Take Immediate Exit-
Escorted (TIE-E), Take Immediate Exit (TIE), Take 
Immediate Exit-Normal (TIE-N). 
It is noteworthy that the severity class also 
determines the priority of the corresponding 
manoeuvre. In case of occurrence of multiple failure 
modes in the same vehicle, the manoeuvre with the 
highest priority is applied. The successive failure of 
maneuvers may eventually lead to a state where no 
maneuvers are available to recover the faulty 
situation. This is illustrated by the state machine in 
Figure 1, where v_KO identifies such a state. The 
transitions correspond to the occurrence of failure 
modes, or to the results of maneuver executions that 
might succeed (transitions to the safe state, v_OK) or 
fail (KO transitions). Whether state v_KO 
corresponds to an unsafe state for the AHS or not, 
depends on the state of the adjacent vehicles.  
Figure 1: Failure modes, manoeuvres, safety impact  
When nearly simultaneous failures affect multiple 
vehicles, in particular adjacent vehicles, in the same 
platoon or in neighbouring platoons, the manoeuvre 
with the highest priority is applied. The success of a 
manoeuvre depends on many factors, for example, 
the state of faulty vehicles in the platoon, the 
capability of the adjacent vehicles needed to assist 
the faulty vehicle to realize the manoeuvre 
(particularly the leaders concerned by the 
manoeuvre), and the traffic flow. 
Based on the analysis presented in [9], we 
summarize in Table 3 three catastrophic situations 
that would lead the AHS to an unsafe state, taking 
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into account the number of failures affecting adjacent 
vehicles and their severity.  
Table 3: Catastrophic situations 
Situation Description 
ST1 At least two Class A failures  
ST2 
At least one Class A failure  
    AND { (two Class B failures)  
    OR (one Class B AND one Class C failures)  
    OR (three Class C failures) } 
ST3 At least four failures whose severities correspond to Class B or Class C 
The evaluated measure, )(tS , corresponds to 
system unsafety, where t is the time. It is given by 
the probability that the system is in one of the above 
catastrophic situations.  
2.1 Safety modelling  
We consider a two lane AHS with one platoon in 
each lane. Vehicles in each platoon can change from 
one platoon to the other one freely. Each platoon 
contains up to N vehicles. We model this system, 
taking into account the four coordination strategies of 
Table 1, the six failure modes and the associated 
manoeuvres presented Table 2, and the catastrophic 
situations of Table 3.  
As discussed in Section 2, several factors need to be 
considered when analyzing the impact of failures on 
the safety of an AHS. In particular, the success or 
failure of a recovery manoeuvre depends on the 
state of the adjacent vehicles contributing to the 
manoeuvre. Thus, the models also describe the 
configuration of the platoons as well as their dynamic 
evolution. 
Figure 2 shows the overall structure of the model 
describing the AHS composed of two lanes. The 
model includes 2N replicas of the One_vehicle sub 
model that are composed with the Configuration, 
Dynamicity, and Severity submodels. The One_vehicle 
submodel describes the behaviour of a vehicle as 
resulting from its failure modes and the manoeuvres 
presented in Table 2. The Severity submodel 
describes the impact of multiple failures affecting 
several vehicles. The sub model Dynamicity models 
the dynamics of the system in the absence of 
failures, resulting from join and leave events that 
correspond to vehicles entering or getting out of the 
highway. The Configuration submodel initializes the 
other submodels and synchronizes their evolution 
according to the whole system evolution. 
For illustration purpose, we show in Figure 3 the 
SAN of One-vehicle. The other models are given in 
[10].  
The model consists of six interconnected elementary 
SANs; each of which models the occurrence of a 
failure mode for a given class of severity and the 
associated manoeuvre. An elementary SAN consists 
of: i) two places (CCi, SMi), ii) two input gates (fi, IGi), 
iii) two output gates (OGi, fmi), and iv) two timed 
activities (Li, manoeuvre). This model is replicated 2N 
times (i.e., one model for each vehicle). Places CCi 
are local to each sub model. Each place CCi receives 
one token when a vehicle enters the platoon (i.e., 
place IN is marked). Place Int_id saves the ID of each 
vehicle in the system. Place Start_id is used for the 
initialization of the submodel.  
Figure 2: Model structure  
Figure 3: One_vehicle SAN model  
Place CCi identifies the initial state from which the 
failure mode described by timed activity Li with firing 
rate i could be fired. The occurrence of the failure 
mode activates the associated manoeuvre (place 
SMi is marked). The selection of the appropriate 
manoeuvre (TIE-N, TIE, TIE-E, GS, CS, or AS) 
depends on its priority compared to other 
manoeuvres that might be already active, and on the 
state of the adjacent vehicles contributing to the 
manoeuvre. The predicates and the functions 
associated with the input gates IGi and the output 
gates fmi manage the priority of manoeuvres as 
defined in Table 2 and check the marking of places 
SMi of the adjacent vehicles, according to the 
coordination strategy presented in Table 1. When a 
higher priority manoeuvre is activated, all lower 
priority manoeuvres associated with the same 
vehicle are inhibited. The execution times of the 
manoeuvres are described by exponentially 
distributed timed activities with firing rates ( TIE-N, TIE, 
TIE-E, CS, GS, and AS). 
If the manoeuvre succeeds, place v_OK is marked to 
indicate that the vehicle gets out of the platoon 
safely. The manoeuvre failure leads the vehicle to 
start the next higher priority manoeuvre. Eventually, 
if the manoeuvre in highest priority AS fails, v_KO is 
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marked, and the vehicle becomes a free agent (this 
is not represented in the model because it will 
constitute a third platoon). The two platoons continue 
their way without this vehicle.  
When a vehicle gets out of the platoon by reaching 
one of the places v_OK or v_KO, another vehicle 
could join the system. This is modelled through the 
timed activity Back_to and the marking of place OUT. 
2.2 Examples of Results 
We illustrate the type of results obtained from the 
processing of the SAN models. The analyses focus 
on the impact on S (t) of the failure rates associated 
with the failure modes, the maximum number of 
vehicles per platoon, the trip duration, and the AHS 
coordination strategies.  
We assume that all the processes represented by 
timed activities in the SAN models have exponential 
distributions (i.e., have constant occurrence rates). 
Let be the smallest failure rate. To facilitate 
sensitivity analyses, the values of the failure rates i 
associated with the six failure modes FMi identified 
in Table 2 are expressed in terms of . In this paper, 
considering the contribution of all sources of failures 
that can lead to the considered failure mode, we 
have used the following values: 
6= 4 ;  5=3 ;  4=2 ;  3=2 ;  2=2 ;  1= . 
The values of execution rates associated with the 
manoeuvres ( TIE-N, TIE, TIE-E, CS, GS, AS) range 
from 15/hr and 30/hr (manoeuvre durations between 
4 and 2 minutes).  
We suppose that the two highway lanes start initially 
with N vehicles in each platoon (platoon1 and 
platoon2). At any time each vehicle can change from 
its platoon to the other one, with constant change 
rates. We consider the same numerical values for 
the two change rates equal to 6/hr. 
The numerical values used are inspired from real life 
similar situations. However, these values can be 
easily modified. The results have been obtained, 
using the simulator provided by the Möbius tool. 
Each point of the graphs has been computed as a 
mean of at least 10000 simulation batches, 
converging within 95% probability in a 0.1 relative 
interval. Actually, the total number of simulation 
batches mainly depends on the value of the failure 
rate considered. 
Figure 4 shows the impact of N, the maximum 
number of vehicles per platoon on S (t) , for trip 
durations varying from 2 to 10 hours. For a given N, 
the probability of reaching the unsafe state increases 
by one order of magnitude when the trip duration 
goes from 2 to 10 hours.  
For a given trip duration, increasing N leads to a 
significant increase of S (t) . For example, from N=8 
to N=12, the unsafety is one order of magnitude 
higher, for a 10 hour trip duration. 
Figure 4: S (t) for different platoon lengths, N 
The impact of the failure rate, , is illustrated in 
Figure 5. We notice that the probability of reaching 
an unsafe state is very sensitive to the value of . 
For example, increasing from 10-6/hr to 10-5/hr, 
leads to an increase of unsafety of about 175 times, 
for a trip duration of 6 hours. The variation of system 
unsafety is lower (about 40 times) when increasing 
from 10-5/hr to 10-4/hr for the same trip duration. 
Also, it can be noticed that the sensitivity of S (t) to 
the trip duration is higher for lower values of .  
For =10-4/hr the steady state is reached very 
quickly. For a 2 hour trip duration, the unsafety is 
almost 10-12 for =10-6/hr. This is why the 
corresponding result is not plotted.  
Figure 5: S (t) for various failure rates, 
 
The results in Figures 4 and 5 correspond to the 
case of a decentralized inter- and intra-platoon 
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coordination strategy (DD). Figure 6 compares the 
unsafety for the four strategies in Table 1: DD 
(Decentralized inter- and intra-platoon) DC 
(Decentralized inter-platoon and Centralized intra-
platoon), CD (Centralized inter-platoon and 
Decentralized intra-platoon), and CC (Centralized 
inter- and intra-platoon). We can see that the inter-
platoon strategy has more impact than the intra-
platoon, with a higher safety observed for the 
decentralized inter-platoon strategy. This is due to 
the fact that more vehicles are involved in the 
centralized inter-platoon. 
Figure 6: S (t) and coordination strategy 
Actually, the system unsafety should depend on the 
number of vehicles in each platoon that might be 
affected by failures. The number of vehicles depends 
on the frequency at which vehicles join and leave the 
platoon. In order to have a better understanding of 
the combined influence of the join and leave rates, 
we analyze the evolution of system unsafety as a 
function of the load of the platoon =
  
join rate
leave rate
.  
The results are plotted in Figure 7 with different 
values for the join and leave rates. It is interesting to 
see that similar trends are observed for all the 
curves, with the highest unsafety observed for the 
highest join rate. Comparison of the results 
corresponding to different values of and a fixed 
value of the leave rate shows that the highest value 
leads to the highest level of unsafety. However, the 
results are of the same order of magnitude. 
2.3 Concluding comments 
The results obtained for the AHS application 
provide some indications about the optimal size of 
platoons and the maximum trip duration, as well as 
the most suitable coordination strategy of the 
platoons that lead to better safety. For instance, for 
the parameters considered in our study, the size of 
the platoons should not exceed 10, which is 
consistent with the numbers considered in 
experimental tests, as reported in [6] for example. 
Another interesting result concerns the coordination 
strategy: the best results are obtained for 
decentralized coordination strategies both for inter 
and intra-platoon communications. 
Figure 7: S (t) versus trip duration 
3. Virtual Black-Box Application 
The impact of mobility on the dependability of a 
vehicular application is further investigated in the 
context of the Virtual-Black Box (VBB) application. 
We consider the case where a vehicle periodically 
and almost continuously collects data items in the 
form of records. A record gathers information related 
to the Vehicle speed and movements, actuation of 
brakes, direction indicator, light, throttle position(s), 
etc. From a practical point of view, the last 
successive data records generated during the last 15 
to 30 seconds before the accident form a full set of 
data allowing tracing back the accident. Let z be the 
number of records during this period of time. As the 
data is updated very frequently, the loss of a small 
number of data records, among this full set of data, 
may not affect significantly the accuracy of the 
collected information. Particularly, when we need to 
understand what had happened just before the 
occurrence of an accident, it could be sufficient to 
analyse only r records among the last z records 
generated before the accident.  
Primarily, the records are stored in the Vehicle itself, 
before being delivered to the fixed infrastructure as 
soon as a service access point is encountered to 
complement and update the historical data already 
recorded in the VBB. Between two updates, the most 
recent information that is critical in case of an 
accident is only in the Vehicle itself, and there is a 
high probability that it will be lost due to the accident. 
The idea is to take advantage of surrounding 
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vehicles encountered (participant vehicles) to 
replicate safely the data before being transmitted to 
the fixed infrastructure. The temporary data can be 
transmitted to the fixed infrastructure either by the 
Vehicle or by the participant vehicles. 
Replication of the data records may be handled 
either by creating full copies of the records (we refer 
to this as replication by duplication) or by more 
sophisticated mechanisms using a replication by 
fragmentation strategy to protect the data records 
against accidental as well as malicious threats, in the 
same way as in [11].  
The replication by fragmentation strategy is based 
on the erasure coding techniques that are well suited 
to ensure data availability and confidentiality in the 
presence of permanent failures [12, 13]. Let us 
consider a data record collected by the Vehicle at a 
given time that must be saved at the fixed 
infrastructure via some participant vehicles. An 
erasure coding algorithm with parameters n and k  
(n  k), produces n fragments of the original record 
that are scattered among participant vehicles. An 
optimal erasure code allows (n k) failures (or 
erasures) to be tolerated (beside that of the primary 
replica), i.e., k fragments are necessary and 
sufficient to recover the original data record [13]. 
Wherever a participant vehicle gains access to the 
fixed infrastructure, it transfers all the data fragments 
that are replicated on its storage facilities. In 
particular, in case of an accident, it is expected that 
all the fragments on the participant vehicles will 
eventually be delivered to the fixed infrastructure to 
be used for the analysis. 
We consider that every encounter between vehicles 
offers a storage opportunity. Specially, every vehicle 
encountered is considered to be a participant vehicle 
that unconditionally accepts storage requests from 
the Vehicle. The Vehicle unconditionally sends one 
data fragment to each vehicle encountered. Note 
that scenarios in which not all encounters offer 
storage opportunities (e.g., with vehicles refusing to 
cooperate) can be simply modelled by introducing a 
participant/encounter ratio as an additional 
parameter. 
Replication by duplication of the data corresponds 
to the case n=k=1. 
We analyse the unavailability of the VBB application 
via the evaluation of the probability of data loss, i.e., 
the asymptotic probability, noted UA, of reaching a 
state where more than r data records among z 
records generated during a certain time interval are 
lost before being delivered to the fixed infrastructure. 
The data availability clearly depends on the mobility 
of the vehicles and their connectivity dynamics, in 
particular, the rate at which the vehicles meet (i. e., 
the vehicle encounter process) and the rate at which 
they meet an access point of the fixed infrastructure.  
Several studies have been carried out to analyse the 
vehicle encounter process using simulation, real-
traces or analytical proofs [14-16]. They show that 
there are still different opinions about which of the 
two distributions (Pareto or exponential) applies for 
describing the vehicle encounter process. Thus, in 
this paper we consider both cases: the vehicle-to-
vehicle encounter process follows an exponential or 
a Pareto distribution. 
With respect to the process that models the 
connection of a vehicle to the fixed infrastructure, 
[15] shows that this process can be modelled by an 
exponential distribution, in urban networks. A similar 
conclusion is derived in [14] for highways. Hence, we 
consider that the vehicle-to-infrastructure encounter 
process follows an exponential distribution. 
3.1 Availability modelling 
Figure 7 shows the overall structure of the model 
describing the VBB application. The model includes 
z replicas of the One_record sub model that are 
composed with two other sub models: 
Records_generation and Severity. The One_record 
sub model describes the behavior of a record as 
resulting from its data loss modes and the 
associated data replication strategy presented in 
Section 3. The Severity sub model describes the 
impact of multiple data losses of data records in the 
system. The sub model Record_generation is used 
to model and manage the records generated by the 
Vehicle in the absence of data loss, to initialize the 
other sub models and to synchronize their evolution 
according to the whole system evolution. 
As for the AHS, we detail only one submodel, 
corresponding to the One-record model in Figure 9, 
the other models are given in [17].   
Figure 8: Model structure. 
Figure 9 focuses on the vehicular ad-hoc part of the 
VBB application, purposefully ignoring issues related 
to the implementation of the fixed infrastructure 
functionalities. Thus, one fragment of one 
disseminated record is considered safe (i.e., it 
cannot be lost) whenever either its creator the 
Vehicle or a participant vehicle storing it is able to 
access the fixed infrastructure. In other words, the 
server of the fixed infrastructure of the VBB 
application is assumed to be very reliable (i.e., it has 
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enough redundancy and fault tolerance to ensure a 
very low failure rate that can be neglected).  
Finally, we assume that when a participant vehicle 
fails before reaching the fixed infrastructure, all the 
fragments it holds are lost. Thus, with (n,k) erasure 
coding, one record is definitely lost if and only if the 
record on the Vehicle is lost and less than k 
fragments of the data record are available on the 
participants and at the fixed infrastructure. 
The One_record model in Figure 9 consists of three 
main processes represented by timed activities: 
 
A: the vehicle-to-vehicle encounter process; 
depending on the considered mobility scenario, A 
is either modelled by an exponential distribution 
with a constant rate or by a Pareto distribution 
with parameters p and s.  
B: the vehicle-to-infrastructure encounter 
process, represented by (Bv, Bp) with rates . Bv 
is for the Vehicle and Bp is for the participants.  
D: the data loss process, at the Vehicle (Dv) and 
the participants side (Dp); both have exponential 
distributions with constant rate .  
The model is divided into two interacting subnets. 
The subnet on the left describes the evolution of a 
data record at the Vehicle side: either it is lost, with 
rate (activity Dv), or it reaches the fixed 
infrastructure, with rate (activity Bv). Places 
one_record_created and OD denote situations 
where the data record on the Vehicle is available or 
is lost, respectively. When a record is created, the 
place one_record_created will be marked with one 
token (see Records_generation submodel). 
The subnet on the right describes: (i) the data 
encoding process with an erasure code (n,k) leading 
to the creation of fragments (place MF) on 
participant vehicles as they are encountered (activity 
A ), and (ii) the process leading to the storage of the 
fragments (place SF) at the fixed infrastructure (rate 
activity Bp ), or its loss caused by the failure of the 
participant vehicle (rate activity Dp ). Place FC 
initial marking denotes the number of fragments to 
create (n). The rates associated with the loss of a 
fragment or its storage on the fixed infrastructure are 
weighted by the marking of place MF, i.e., the 
number of fragments that can enable the 
corresponding activities. The timed activity A will be 
fired when the place one_record_created is marked 
and still there are fragments to distribute to 
participants (i.e., place FC marked). This is managed 
by the predicates in the input and output gates, IA 
and OA, respectively. The firing of activity A 
decrements the marking of place FC by one, 
increments the marking of place MF by one, and 
without affecting the marking of place 
one_record_created.  
Figure 9: One_record SAN model. 
Two places with associated immediate activities 
(T_DS, T_DL) are used in the sub model to identify 
when the data record is safely stored in the fixed 
infrastructure (place DS), or is definitely lost (place 
DL), respectively. The data safe state is reached 
(i.e., DS is marked) when the original data record 
from the Vehicle or at least k fragments from the 
participants reach the fixed infrastructure. The data 
loss state is reached (i.e., DL is marked) when the 
original data record from the Vehicle is lost, and less 
than k fragments are available on the participants 
and at the fixed infrastructure side. This condition is 
represented by a predicate associated with the input 
gate (T1). Finally, the predicates and the functions 
associated with the output gates (OBv, ODp, OBp) 
and the input gates (DBv, DBp, T2) manage the sub 
model by applying liveliness predicate , true if and 
only if DS and DL are not marked (m(DS)=m(DL)=0); 
as soon as one of these places is marked, no activity 
can be fired in this submodel. 
Place Rec_id saves the ID of each data record 
generated in the system. Place Start_id is used for 
the initialization of the sub model (i.e., a new 
One_record is generated). When the place DL is 
marked for an One_record submodel and still the 
system generating the records is available, another 
record will be generated by adding one token to the 
place Start-id. 
3.2 Examples of results 
The analyses focus on the impact of the parameters 
summarized in Table 4. We will first address the 
unavailability of one data record, and then we will 
address the VBB unavailability.  
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Table 4: Parameters used for modelling VBB 
The vehicle-to-vehicle encounter rate 
The vehicle-to-infrastructure encounter rate 
c The connectivity ratio = 
 
Data loss rate, for the Vehicle and participants  
n, k Parameters of the erasure code 
r, z 
The accuracy required of the historical data to 
analyse what happened when an accident occurs 
Figure 10 shows the unavailability of a single data 
record as a function of the data loss rate , in the 
case of: i) the replication by duplication strategy 
(n=k=1) when the vehicle-to-vehicle encounter 
process is described by either an exponential or a 
Pareto distribution, and ii) without replication in the 
ad-hoc domain n=k=0; (i.e., the data record is stored 
on the Vehicle until it is delivered to the fixed 
infrastructure when an access point is encountered).   
Figure 10: Data record unavailability 
The values assigned to parameters p and s of the 
Pareto distribution are such that the mean time 
between encounters is equal to 1/ , the mean of the 
exponential distribution to which it is compared. 
Figure 10 has a log-Log scale. The linear increase of 
UA for increasing values of induces a power law 
relationship between these two quantities. Also, it 
can be observed that the unavailability is impacted 
by the connectivity ratio c characterizing the mobility 
scenario. This figure shows that even for low values 
of c, replication decreases significantly the data 
record unavailability. 
Figure 11 highlights the impact of the replication 
strategy on the unavailability of one data record for 
an exponential vehicle-to-vehicle encounter process 
(similar results are obtained for the Pareto case). It 
compares the unavailability associated to the 
replication by duplication strategy (denoted UA(1,1)) 
to the unavailability associated to the replication by 
fragmentation strategy using an erasure code (n ,k) 
(denoted UA(n,k)), through the ratio UA(1,1)/UA(n,k).  
Figure 11: Impact of the replication strategy 
It can be noticed that the unavailability decreases as 
n and k increase. Also, it appears that the potential 
gain yielded by the use of an erasure code 
compared to replication by duplication is rather 
modest (less than 2 times in the most favourable 
case). It should be mentioned that a noticeable 
advantage of erasure codes over the replication by 
duplication is the fact that they are generally used to 
ensure security related properties too, in particular 
confidentiality. The higher is k the better is the 
confidentiality. However, the assessment of these 
properties is not the focus of this paper.  
The impact of the variation of z (the last records 
generated before the accident) and r (the number of 
records among z that could be sufficient to analyse 
the causes of the accident) on the VBB unavailability 
is illustrated in Figure 12. It shows that the higher is 
z the higher is the unavailability and the difference is 
significant (e.g., the unavailability corresponding to 
(z=7, r=5) is 7 times higher than the unavailability 
with (z=5, r=3) when = 10-3/h). 
Figure 13 shows that the potential gain due to 
replication is significant. The maximum gain is 
obtained in the case of exponential vehicle-to-vehicle 
encounters for c=100. This figure also shows that 
the distribution of the vehicle-to-vehicle encounters 
(exponential or Pareto) has a significant impact too.  
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Figure 12: Impact of z on VBB unavailability 
Figure 13: Replication by duplication 
3.3 Concluding comments 
The results obtained show that the VBB 
application exhibits different levels of availability 
when considering mobility scenarios with Pareto or 
exponential distributions, depending on the value of 
the connectivity ratio in the corresponding 
environment. Another noteworthy result concerns the 
availability gain yielded by the data replication in the 
ad-hoc domain compared to the case where such a 
replication is not used. The unavailability can be 
decreased thanks to replication by a factor up to the 
connectivity ratio (100 in our study) when 
considering a single data record. This result confirms 
the conclusion derived in [18] and shows that it is 
also valid in mobility environments where vehicle-to-
vehicle encounter process follows a Pareto 
distribution. Moreover, our study shows that the gain 
brought by replication can be significantly high.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper presented two case studies from the 
automotive domain that relies on mobile 
communication technologies and mobile ad-hoc 
networks to improve the safety or the availability of 
the service delivered to the users. A challenging 
problem when modelling such applications is to take 
into account in an integrated way: i) the failure 
modes affecting the vehicles, their severity level, and 
the associated recovery mechanisms, i) the vehicle 
coordination strategies, and ii) the dynamics of the 
systems resulting from their mobility. 
We focussed on the dependability modelling of the 
corresponding applications to evaluate quantitative 
measures that can be used by the designers to 
perform sensitivity analyses and to highlight the 
impact of relevant design parameters and of the 
applications environment.  
We have applied a similar approach based on 
stochastic activity networks for the modelling of the 
platooning and the VBB applications investigated in 
this paper. The dependability modelling approach 
has been designed to master the complexity of the 
models taking into account the dynamic evolution of 
the corresponding systems. The system model is 
elaborated based on submodels characterizing the 
vehicles behavior resulting from failures, that are 
then replicated and composed with other submodels 
describing the system configuration and its dynamic 
evolution. Such evolution results from vehicles 
joining and leaving the network of communicating 
vehicles involved in the application.  
The feasibility and the flexibility of the proposed 
approach was illustrated by considering different 
dependability measures highlighting various facets of 
the considered applications related to safety and 
availability, as well as different dependability 
mechanisms, coordination strategies and mobility 
scenarios. Various examples are also presented to 
illustrate the kind of results and sensitivity studies 
that can be achieved.  
The models presented in this paper can be extended 
to analyze more complex use cases and mobility 
scenarios. In such a context, the combination of 
different types of formalisms and evaluation 
techniques including analytical models, simulation 
and experimental measurements might be needed in 
order to provide detailed evaluations of end-to-end 
scenarios taking into different decomposition and 
abstraction levels of the system. An example of a 
holistic approach following these directions is 
presented in [19]). 
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